Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia (VAP) is the leading cause of death associated with healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) (IHI, 2012). With 300,000 cases of VAP annually in the U.S., this preventable illness is estimated to cost $50,000 per patient (Fraser et al., 2008). In addition to being the second most common nosocomial infection worldwide, VAP is the most life threatening (Timsit et al., 2017). Prevention of VAP is inexpensive and could save up to $1.5 billion per year (Scott, 2009). Although VAP does not represent the majority of pneumonia cases, those on a ventilator are most at risk for developing the infection (Magill et al., 2014).
Our APSS outline actionable steps healthcare organizations should take to successfully implement and sustain behavior change for high reliability, shared understanding, thorough communication, and meaningful person-centered care across the organization.
Actionable steps include:
APSS are revised annually and available free of charge on our website for download.
Login to access and download the APSS if you are part of the global patient safety community. If you don’t have an account, we invite you to join the global community today.
Get instant access to view and download the Actionable Patient Safety Solutions so you can start implementing patient safety processes today.
Each APSS is developed by a multidisciplinary workgroup comprised of patient safety experts, healthcare technology professionals, hospital leaders, and patient advocates. The Foundation is proud to connect as many stakeholders as possible to focus on how these challenges can best be addressed.
Join An APSS WorkgroupWe believe that progress cannot be achieved by sitting on the sidelines; we must take ACTION together. Like-minded individuals are the driving force that makes our mission to reach ZERO preventable deaths not just conceivable, but achievable.
Join for FreeAdd your organization’s logo to our Actionable Patient Safety Solutions (APSS)
Learn MoreInterested in sharing your performance improvement work and learning from others?
Learn MoreMy mother, Vera Eliscu, was an alert, active, highly intellectual retired classical dancer and business-woman. In January 2009, at the age of 90, she was admitted to the hospital for treatment of a foot ulcer and cellulitis. An MRI showed the bone in her foot was unaffected.
After five days in the hospital Mom was released to a long-term care facility with a two-week antibiotic prescription and instructions to stay off her foot. Within eight days at the long-term care facility she had contracted the intestinal infection Clostridium difficile and developed pneumonia in the bottom of her left lung. She was readmitted to the hospital. While an aide was feeding her the first night in the hospital, she aspirated food into her lungs. She developed double pneumonia and was sent to the ICU, where she was intubated and put on a ventilator. In the ICU she was extubated twice but her course was uneven and after a week it was determined that she needed a tracheotomy, PICC line, and feeding tube. She received a size 7 tracheotomy tube.
After 10 days in ICU, Mom was transferred to a step-down unit and then a long-term acute care facility for vent-weaning and physical therapy. She did very well weaning and was getting out of bed and ready to walk again. We spent hours together in her room reading from her precious art books and discussing the state of the world. We looked forward eagerly to Mom coming home.
Eleven days after Mom entered the long-term acute care facility, a temporary respiratory therapist changed her tracheotomy tube to a size 4, a very small tube that is difficult to suction. The tracheotomy tube slipped out unnoticed the next day as the nurses were turning her, leaving her without oxygen for 5 to15 minutes. Oxygen was not given promptly or correctly and Mom was in and out of a coma. She was visibly in pain and unable to speak or move. I could see the pain and fear in her eyes, but she never spoke again.
Within three weeks of the tracheotomy tube event, Mom had developed a 13-cm Stage 4 bedsore. The long-term acute care facility did not offer a wound vacuum, because they did not have one, and they did no physical therapy to prevent bedsores. Mom became malnourished, was overloaded with fluids, contracted Clostridium difficile, and developed a urinary tract infection. Eventually, she was transferred to a different long-term acute care facility where she received excellent care, but it was too late. Mom passed away in August 2009, six months after her anoxic brain injury and eight months after being admitted to the hospital for a foot ulcer.
I would like to introduce my daughter Sabina Paradi.
She was a dietetic fellow at Columbia University, New York Hospital, in 2007 when she sustained traumatic brain injury after being struck by a truck in New York’s Lower West Side on the way from a play.
The system worked perfectly when she was assisted immediately by a passing nurse. In minutes she was dispatched via ambulance by a fine paramedical team and was brought for evaluation in the hospital.
This is where the system broke down. The immediate reaction by the team was to attempt to relieve acute elevated intracerebral pressure. The method chosen, hemicraniectomy, and the anesthetic (propofol) were both inappropriate to her care. Hemicraniectomy has been shown in a later study to be inappropriate in most cases. Propofol has been banned by the FDA in the treatment of pediatric traumatic brain injury patients because of various complications. My daughter was very slight of build, under 100 lbs, easily smaller than many pediatric cases. She was also athletic, which may have increased the tendency for higher intracerebral pressure. She had been ill for over a week, having contracted a resistant infection from one of her patients, and was taking antibiotics.
How would systems improvement have helped at this stage? Her condition should have been evaluated by a higher level of expertise, and used tools like teleconferencing and remote medicine to get the opinion of a nationwide team of experts. The hospital throughout her care lacked access to medical expertise other than what appeared to be a very overworked neurosurgeon. Traumatic brain injury cases in the first hours require extraordinary care in their evaluation.
What happened next? What happened next, I believe, is responsible for her death. She contracted a resistant pneumonia which was identified with her respirator. Complicating everything was that she was taking antibiotics, and therefore immunosuppressed; she had a head injury and was therefore immunosuppressed; she sustained extensive neurosurgery and was therefore immunosuppressed; and she was sedated and therefore immunosuppressed. The infections deepened her coma, along with the sedation.
Risking surgery and sedation in her case was very much contraindicated. There were and are many alternate protocols for handling cases like hers. Greater knowledge and the use of artificial intelligence might have led to an entirely different treatment regime. Other items needed were immediately accessible MRI, preferably state of the art; real-time polymerase chain reaction tests for the detection of microbial infections, in particular fungal infections which seem to plague the immunosuppressed; and a modern neurological intensive care facility. The facility at my daughter’s hospital had a ward shared among four neurologically impaired patients, all quite likely immunosuppressed.
In the end, what killed my daughter was a complete lack of knowledge of her condition which instrumentation and broader, specialized knowledge would have alleviated. Facilities like the US military traumatic brain injury facility at Ramstein, Germany, are more appropriate to the treatment of moderate to severe traumatic brain injury than hospital emergency rooms. It is my view that all such patients should be evacuated to very large specialty hospitals that treat only severe neurological conditions such as stroke, TBI, encephalitis, and the like. Air transport systems and stabilization protocols need to follow the military model.
“An underlying medical condition” is no excuse for lethal medical errors.
Millie Niss was a much-published web artist and poet. She was my only child and a wonderful daughter. She was a talented patient advocate due to a lifetime of painful and debilitating illness, diagnosed as Behcet’s Disease in her early 30s.
Behcet’s is a rare, auto-immune, inflammatory disease which causes vasculitis anywhere in the body. It is often characterized by severe joint pain, skin lesions, and vision loss. It is rarely fatal, but involves frequent medical intervention.
I am a retired psychologist with decades of experience in advocacy. Yet our experience and our instinct that Millie’s care in a community hospital ICU was going desperately wrong could not save Millie.
Millie died November 29, 2009. She was 36 years old. She entered the ICU on November 1, 2009 with swine flu and was intubated. But she was not silenced. After she had recovered from the flu, but a week after becoming paralyzed from the chest down, Millie wrote:
I actually asked Dr. W, if I was still at risk of relapse, and she seemed quite confident, but I sensed something was stewing ‒ I think I got a secondary infection whose symptoms didn’t show until the first day upstairs [brief transfer out of ICU]. I became feverish and my throat felt suddenly worse when it had been OK earlier. Now I hope we can treat the infection successfully FIRST before trying to wean [off the ventilator] at all. (Nov 21st)
What did we know and when did we know it?
We did not know the hospital:
Millie had endured and been damaged by medical care previously ‒ often enough that she had requested an autopsy if she died.
The autopsy revealed her cause of death as osteomyelitis of the 8th thoracic vertebra with near total necrosis of the spinal cord, severe epidural inflammation and abscess: a missed diagnosis.
The New York Department of Health issued two citations related to Millie’s care.
-Martha Deed, Ph.D., Author, The Last Collaboration (Furtherfield, 2012). A multi-genre fatality review.
On Sept 21, 2013 we and others were involved in a serious boating accident in which Jennifer sustained multiple internal life-threatening injuries, including several broken bones, head and neck trauma, and external lacerations. She was airlifted to a Level 1 Trauma Center and underwent multiple emergency surgeries.
She remained in a medically-induced coma and on life support systems for the next three weeks. In addition to her recovery from the injuries, Jennifer had to battle hospital-acquired conditions including VAP (Ventilator Associated Pneumonia), a UTI (Urinary Tract Infection), and BSI (Blood Stream Infection) before she regained consciousness and was able to breathe on her own through a trach airway.
After a total of four weeks stay in the Trauma Unit, she was discharged to an LTAC (Long Term Acute Care) facility. Soon thereafter, additional complications showed up including surgical site infection at the trach and a Peg Port infection in the abdomen. After three nights at the LTAC facility, Jennifer had to be admitted back into a Community Hospital for treatment of these newly acquired complications.
After two weeks at this hospital, her condition had significantly improved to where she had become mobile, was disconnected from most all tubes and lines, was able to go to the bathroom on her own, and was looking forward to eating soft foods again. At this time, she was breathing on her own, however, still with assistance through the trach port. Discharge planning had begun and we were told that by Wednesday morning she would be going home and would receive physical rehabilitation assistance. We really thought we had climbed a huge mountain and were now homeward bound.
A final requirement in support of the discharge and to starting on soft foods was that Jennifer needed to pass a barium swallow test.
Early Monday morning during this swallow test it was discovered that Jennifer had a TEF (tracheoesophageal fistula), which is a hole in the tissues between the trach and the esophagus. This a very serious complication and it requires a complex surgery to repair. This discovery triggered a series of intervening events, or at least we assumed so.
First and foremost, as a result of the barium migrating into her lungs, this brought about a high degree of respiratory distress. Over the next 36 hours, Jennifer was bounced and transferred back and forth between multiple units and caregivers. Her respiratory distress was also misdiagnosed as anxiety and thus multiple doses of Ativan were administered, further complicating the situation.
As the distress continued to progress, it ultimately landed Jennifer back in the ICU on Tuesday afternoon. There were no rooms available at this time, so they placed her in a recovery area, at which time the decision was also made to place her back on a ventilator.
Sadly, the caregivers at the time were unaware of the recently diagnosed TEF and they simply began ventilation through the existing trach. For the next 6 hours, they increased the cycle rate and O2 concentration levels until they were at 40 cycles per minute and 100% oxygen. No physical assessment was made, no blood gases were taken, and no ETCO2 monitoring occurred. All the while, the air being pumped into Jennifer was not going to her lungs, but instead escaping and collecting into her abdomen via the TEF.
At 12:04 AM, her body and organs had become completely oxygen deprived and Jennifer went into full cardiac arrest. A code blue was called and CPR was administered for 14 minutes, finally resulting in a restored heartbeat.
Needless to say, her brain had been so severely deprived of oxygen and glucose during this extended period of time that an unrecoverable amount of damage had occurred. The code blue team discovered Jennifer’s belly had been extended to 4X normal size, They did an emergency pressure relief through her abdomen and then re-intubated her, removing the trach and then using a longer ET tube where they isolated the TEF from the lungs.
For the next three weeks, Jennifer was kept alive on life support while remaining in a totally non-responsive state, during which time countless tests, scans, and neurological consults were conducted, all of which pointed to the same conclusion: massive and non-recoverable brain damage.
On November 19th, the decision was made to discontinue life support as there was no hope of reversing or recovering from the complexity and tragedy of these multiple medical communication hand-off errors and acquired complications. To this day, over two years later, not a single person at the hospital has ever said a word to me about the death of my beautiful wife.
Oddly, Blue Cross/Blue Shield (the member Health Plan) paid everyone involved in full, to the tune of $2.1M in submitted medical bills. BC/BS did not even know that Jennifer had passed away from these errors until I contacted them 1.5 years after the fact. And we all wonder why these types of patient safety tragedy stories continue to occur year, after year, after year. It’s really not hard to understand…to say that the system is broken is a gross understatement.